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Abstract 
According to Allen Wood’s “procedural principle” we 
should believe only that which can be justified by evidence, 
and nothing more. He argues that holding beliefs which are 
not justified by evidence diminishes our self-respect and 
corrupts us, both individually and collectively. Wood’s 
normative and descriptive views as regards belief are of a 
piece with the received view which holds that beliefs aim at 
the truth. This view I refer to as the Truth-Tracking View 
(TTV). I first present a modest version of TTV, one which is 
sensitive to standard criticisms and one which is fully 
consistent with the procedural principle. I then raise some 
doubts about TTV by considering both anecdotal cases and 
empirical studies. These studies suggest that certain types of 
belief are designed to aim away from truth, in limited, 
carefully calibrated ways. Moreover, it seems to be the case 
that selectively aiming away from the truth is important for 
human well-being and performance. Beliefs that are designed 
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to aim away I dub “Tertullian” beliefs (t-beliefs). I then limn 
the distinguishing characteristics of t-belief and proceed to 
evaluate the procedural principle in light of the evidence 
which suggests that t-belief plays an important role in our 
cognitive economy. Next I argue that t-beliefs might be 
essential to the maintenance of self-respect and that they do 
not corrupt in the way that Wood claims. Finally, I argue 
that the fate of Wood’s procedural principle will be 
determined by the results of further empirical research— 
sociological, psychological, and neuroscientific. 
 
Key Words: belief, procedural principle, positive illusions, 
depressive realism, and Moore’s paradox 
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I. Introduction  
Allen Wood (2002, 2008) argues that the main principle 
governing the ethics of belief is the “procedural principle.” 1  
According to this principle we should apportion the strength of our 
beliefs to the evidence. In other words we should believe “only 
what is justified by the evidence, and believe it to the full extent, 
but only to the extent, that it is justified by the evidence” (2008: 9). 
Wood qualifies this claim in certain respects (2008: 13, fn. 8) and, 
grudgingly, acknowledges the possibility of non-trivial exceptions 
(2002: 38). Nevertheless, he concludes that failing to adhere to this 
principle invariably violates our self-respect and is, as well, in other 
regards inevitably corrupting (2002: 36, 2008: 24). Similar 
sentiments have been expressed by other philosophers, such as 
Michael Lynch (2004: 143), who writes: “Caring about truth and 
believing the truth about what you care about are necessary parts 
of happiness by being necessary parts of integrity, authenticity, and 
self-respect.”  
Wood is aware of the body of empirical work which suggests 
that people benefit from holding certain false beliefs, as well as 
beliefs not supported by evidence. But for various reasons he 
denies that this work counts against the procedural principle. For 
example, he (2008: 13, fn. 8) proclaims that “no one could stably 
hold both the belief that is supposed to benefit them and also know 
that it is false . . . even if illusions do benefit people’s health, it 
does not seem that this is justification a person could stably or 
self-consistently apply to their own beliefs.” Note that Wood seems 
to be making an empirical claim about the nature of beliefs.  
Wood’s views as regards both normative and descriptive 
                                                 
1
 What I here refer to as the procedural principle is also known as “Clifford’s 
Principle” (Wood, 2002) or the “evidentialist principle” (Wood, 2008: 10). I use 
“procedural” rather than “Clifford’s” to emphasize that my concern is with 
Wood’s version, and I refrain from using “evidentialist,” because this term is more 
often employed by the principle’s critics than by its advocates.  
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aspects of belief are consistent with the received view of beliefs, viz. 
that they “aim at the truth” (Williams, 1973: 137-138).2 Many, 
perhaps a majority, of late 20th and early 21st century 
philosophers have converged on the view that beliefs are 
constituted in such a way that they can be accurately characterized 
by this phrase. Donald Davidson emphasizes their “veridical 
nature” (2003: 366-367) and he (1977: 295) argues that 
“successful communication proves the existence of shared and 
largely true, view of the world;” John R. Searle (2001: 37-38, 257) 
claims that it is their “job” to “represent how things are;” Peter A. 
Railton (2003: 297) holds that belief “not only represents its 
propositional content as true,” it “cannot represent itself as 
unresponsive to—unaccountable to—their truth;” Tim Crane (2001: 
103) says that “holding true” is a synonym for belief; Bernard 
Williams (2002: 80) claims that beliefs are “subject to a norm of 
truth;” and, Ralph Wedgwood (2002: 273) observes that “for every 
proposition p that one consciously considers, the best outcome is 
to believe p when p is true.” Wood’s view, along with this cluster 
of interrelated views, I refer to as the Truth-Tracking View (TTV) 
of belief.  
I shall not concern myself with strong versions of TTV, for 
their vulnerabilities are conspicuous. I here consider only modest 
versions, of which I take J. David Velleman’s (Shah & Velleman, 
2005; Velleman, 1999, 2000) to be representative. Both Wood and 
Velleman exemplify TTV, but Velleman provides a more detailed 
account. Moreover, he is in sympathy with Wood’s normative 
position, and is sensitive to relevant criticisms of TTV.  
Velleman’s version is used below, in part, as a foil against 
which to develop the idea of “aiming away.” Beliefs that aim away 
from the truth I refer to as “Tertullian beliefs” (“t-beliefs”). 
Although all modest versions of TTV do qualify the sense in which 
                                                 
2
 Although the expression is sometimes used metaphorically, it can also be used 
literally, as when one is speaking of the aims of people who form beliefs or of 
design mechanisms that constrain the regulation of beliefs.  
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beliefs can be said to aim at the truth (hence, the attributive 
“modest”), still they lack the resources with which to account for 
the distinctive causal-explanatory role played by t-beliefs. The 
standard qualifications that are appended to modest versions of 
TTV, while perhaps succeeding in making them weakly compatible 
with instances of t-belief, also make it appear that t-beliefs are 
nothing but incidental, variously inconsequential, or “pernicious” 
(Wood, 2002: 40), features of our cognitive economy. After 
sketching Velleman’s account, t-belief is introduced by means of 
examining certain commonplace, anecdotal instances wherein 
behavior contravenes professed beliefs in ways that suggest 
belief-forming mechanisms are not responsive to evidence in the 
ways required by TTV. Next empirical studies of beliefs that aim 
away from the truth are reviewed. Then the distinctive 
characteristics of t-beliefs are limned, such that they can be clearly 
distinguished from other attitudes like desire, hope, or hypothesis. 
Finally, I evaluate Wood’s procedural principle in light of what we 
are now learning about t-beliefs. I argue, pace Wood, that the 
capacity to occasionally and strategically aim askew of the truth 
might be essential to the maintenance of self-respect and that it is 
not necessarily corrupting in the ways that he suggests. In a brief 
concluding section I suggest that whether or not Wood is correct in 
his uncompromising advocacy of the procedural principle will 
ultimately be determined by the results of empirical 
research—sociological, psychological, and neuroscientific.  
II. A Modest Version of TTV 
On Velleman’s (2000: 255) version of TTV, belief is 
constituted both “by its power to cause behavioral output,” and by 
“its responsiveness to epistemic input.” It is not sufficient to claim 
that belief takes its propositional object as representing the way 
things are, for this alone could not distinguish it from certain other 
attitudes (Velleman, 1999: 198-200). What distinguishes belief 
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from, say, assumption or imagination is “the spirit” in which a 
propositional object is regarded as true: an assumption might be 
“tentatively” held and something imagined might be “fancifully” 
held, but a belief is “seriously” held. Fantasies and assumptions are 
not “serious” because they entail accepting a proposition as true 
without sensitivity to whether a person is “accepting” the truth. To 
believe is not to “accept” for polemical or heuristic purposes (as is 
the case with assuming), neither is it to “accept” for recreational or 
motivational purposes (as is the case with imagining); instead, to 
believe is to accept a proposition “with the aim of doing so if and 
only if it really is true” (Velleman, 1999: 200; see also Wood, 
2002: 19-20). 3  Beliefs are regulated—formed, revised, and 
extinguished—in truth-conducive ways, in ways that are responsive 
to evidence and reasoning (Shah & Velleman, 2005: 498).4
To say that beliefs aim at the truth is not to say that the aim is 
to believe as many truths as possible; nor is the aim to believe as 
many as possible useful or valued truths; nor indeed is it to say that 
the aim is maximizing the proportion of truths to falsehoods 
among one’s beliefs (Velleman, 2000: 251-255). TTV requires only 
that beliefs aim at the truth in some way, while allowing that there 
are multiple ways in which they might do so. It further allows that 
belief is not exclusively governed by truth-seeking mechanisms 
(Shah & Velleman, 2005: 500-501; Velleman, 2000: 254): some 
mechanisms may cause beliefs that occasionally diverge from the 
truth (the adoption of better-safe-than-sorry strategies). But 
Velleman holds that belief is necessarily subject to mechanisms 
                                                 
3
 Belief and imagination can be combined though, as in cases of metaphorical belief 
(McGinn, 2004: 134). A simple example would be employing a simile to express 
one’s belief, such as “the sky is like the ocean.”  
4
 Although Wood speaks more of evidence (empirical, a priori, etc.) than of truth, 
it is clear that what matters for both is this—responsiveness to evidence and 
reasoning (2008: 10). He makes the implied conceptual relationship between 
evidence and truth explicit when he writes that there is “no other responsible 
guide to what beliefs are true than that which the evidence indicates” (2002: 
70-71).  
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designed to make it true: “the input constraints definitive of belief 
are designed to yield beliefs that are true” (Velleman, 2000: 277). 
In other words, mechanisms that are not truth-seeking are not 
definitive of belief.  
Because only some beliefs are caused by the goal-directed 
activity of persons, and many are the results of processes that do 
not involve agential goals or intentions, the concept of belief must 
include more than just the manner in which beliefs are actually 
regulated. A “standard of correctness,” a normative standard, must 
also be applied (Shah & Velleman, 2005: 498-500). Modest TTV 
then conjoins the descriptive and the normative: belief is regarded 
as “truth-regulated acceptance.” And to this a norm of truth is then 
applied. Norms governing belief are understood in a 
“biconditional” sense (Shah & Velleman, 2005: 519): although 
they do not require acceptance of every belief that would be 
correct, they do forbid the holding of a belief that would be 
incorrect. These norms may be lax in what they require a person to 
accept, but they are strict in what they prohibit—the holding of 
incorrect beliefs. Wood (2008: 10) expresses this prohibition thus: 
“beliefs not justified by the evidence are immoral.”  
Velleman (2000: 277-279) considers the possibility that 
beliefs might aim at “instrumental success” or “empirical 
adequacy.” But he claims that while we might sometimes settle for 
an alternative to truth as a “second-order” aim, truth remains the 
“first-order” aim. Suggesting an analogy he observes that a 
basketball player might proclaim that his ultimate aim is to earn a 
salary increase, but fans don’t thereby presume that everything he 
does on the court is aimed at the salary increase, because the best 
way to achieve the salary increase is to aim at victory itself. Money 
might be the object for playing the game, but within the context of 
the game winning is adopted as the aim. “Similarly, we may enter 
the game of having beliefs on a particular subject because we want 
our motivating cognitions on that subject to yield successful actions; 
but success in action does not thereby become the object of the 
game.”  
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Velleman (2000: 278) is dismissive of the possibility that we 
might discover beliefs to be regulated so as to aim at something 
other than truth. He justifies this dismissal with a claim about the 
content of our introspections: when we discern a gap between a 
belief and the truth, the belief becomes unsettled and starts to 
change (see also Wood, 2008: 13, fn. 8). Alternatively, if the belief 
persists, another belief is formed to help close the gap, while the 
original belief is reclassified as an illusion or bias. Non-evidential 
considerations simply cannot be explicitly treated “as relevant to 
the question what to believe. Any influence that such 
considerations exert must be unacknowledged.”5
III. Some Doubts About TTV 
If, as Velleman contends, beliefs are constituted by their 
power to cause behavior and by their responsiveness to epistemic 
input, if they aim at the truth, and if they are indeed subject to 
mechanisms or constraints that are designed to yield true beliefs, 
then, at minimum, we might reasonably expect that when, on good 
evidence, a person categorically and sincerely asserts that a belief is 
untrue, that same person should not act as though it were true, 
especially when acting as though it were true incurs greater cost 
than would be incurred were one to act in accord with professed 
beliefs. But there seem to be clear cases in which people possess the 
relevant evidence, do so assert, and yet act as though they hold 
beliefs which they deny holding, even when doing so carries 
significant cost. And these are not, and are not relevantly similar to, 
cases of assumption or fantasy. What’s more, they at least seem to 
                                                 
5
 Shah and Velleman: “It is an objection to belief that it is false . . . it is a fatal 
objection, in the sense that if the person who has the belief accepts the objection, 
he thereby ceases to have the belief, or at least it retreats to subconscious . . .” 
(2005: 531, fn. 16). See also Williams (2002: 67). The received view of beliefs is 
that some are conscious, some not. But extreme positions do exist: Searle holds 
that all beliefs are conscious (1992); Crane (2001: 103-108), that none are.  
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allow for the possibility that non-evidential considerations are 
being explicitly treated as relevant to the question what to believe. 
At least it is not obvious that these considerations exert their 
influence in a manner that is wholly unacknowledged.  
Consider the case of a person born and raised in the western 
world who categorically denies believing that the number 13 
invites bad luck.6 Moreover, this very same person is familiar with 
the arguments and the vast amount of evidence that demonstrate 
that 13 is no more lucky or unlucky than any other number. 
Nevertheless, given the option of choosing between a hotel room 
or an office space on the 13th or the 14th floor, all things being 
equal, he might well be disposed to choose the latter. What’s more, 
for many people the same would likely hold true even if all things 
weren’t equal; that is, even if avoiding 13 were to require greater 
cost. Doubtless there is a limit to just how much greater cost one 
would be willing to incur in order to avoid the 13th, but the 
expenditure of significant time, money, and other resources in the 
avoidance of 13 is not uncommon. 
Were we to employ belief-desire psychology toward 
explaining the relevant behavior, we would likely say “Stan’s belief 
that 13 is unlucky caused him to choose the 14th rather than the 
13th floor,” as part of our explanatory sketch. Here then we 
would have a reasonably clear case in which one has, for good 
reason, denied believing that 13 is unlucky, yet, a specific decision 
was prompted, inter alia, by just that very belief. 7  While the 
                                                 
6
 For those readers for whom the number 13 fails to evoke superstitious anxieties, 
substitute any superstition that does and construct a scenario parallel to the one 
sketched here; nothing hinges on this particular example. Gazzaniga (2008: 
271-272), for example, cites the example of walking quickly past a cemetery at 
night, even though one doesn’t believe in ghosts. The number 13 example is used 
only because it is familiar to a wide audience and because it has been 
demonstrated (Scanlon, Luben, Scanlon, & Singleton, 1993) to consistently and 
significantly affect behavior.  
7
 Case (2000) and Case, Fitness, Cairns, and Stevenson (2004) have provided some 
experimental evidence to support the claim that even skeptics readily resort to 
superstition. For related material see Shermer (2002, 255-313), Talmont- 
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relevant psychology is insufficiently understood, it is by no means 
obvious that non-evidential considerations exert influence in a 
manner that is wholly unacknowledged.  
Recall that, according to Wood and Velleman, if we discern a 
gap between a belief and the truth, the belief becomes unsettled 
and starts to change, or another belief is formed to help close the 
gap, while the original belief is reclassified as an illusion or bias. 
But in this case it seems plausible to claim that the person can be 
aware of the gap and that the belief neither becomes unsettled, nor 
does it require formation of a gap-closing belief. A balanced 
perspective should allow that post hoc introspection concerning 
cases of this sort is theory-laden reflection over “skittish” 
phenomena (Hurlburt & Schwitzgebel, 2007: 48-53). Hence, a 
charitable view of the Wood-Velleman position is that we are left 
with an introspective stand-off.  
If cases of superstition strike some readers as too exotic, 
perhaps vanity products can serve as more compelling examples. 
Alleged cures and treatments for alopecia (and the many other 
assaults on personal vanity) are as numerous as their evidence is 
wanting. But just as with superstitions, there are many people who 
categorically deny believing that these products can promote good 
health or restore one to a hirsute state, yet they act as though they 
hold the very beliefs they deny holding, even when doing so carries 
significant cost.8 Not only are the claims unsubstantiated, positive 
reasons not to believe the claims are plentiful; yet, intelligent 
                                                                                                      
Kaminski (2008), and Vyse (2000). Talmont-Kaminski generalizes from the data 
to assert that superstition is a basic human trait.  
8
 It might be thought that in contexts like this belief should be understood in a 
Bayesian way, i.e. as the assignment of probabilities to statements. But to do so 
would mislead, for the subjects express categorical denial. Moreover, on the 
Bayesian construal, it is perhaps more aptly said that beliefs are just “tentatively” 
held; therefore, it would be incompatible with TTV. Finally, although 
probabilities of statements can be applied in certain situations, still it would seem 
that those situations must then be believed to be of that type by a subject. In other 
words, Bayesian conceptions seem to presuppose the attribution of non-Bayesian 
beliefs (Nozick, 1993: 94-99).  
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consumers behave in ways that contravene professed beliefs. As is 
the case with superstition, here too the possibility of acknowledged, 
non-evidential considerations playing a role in belief regulation 
cannot be dismissed out of hand.  
Some contexts, in particular those that are harrowing or 
life-threatening, can help to further illustrate the point about 
superstition and about marketing gullibility. Consider the case of a 
medical doctor (or scholar, or scientist) who is quite convinced on 
extremely good evidence that herbal treatments like echinacea 
cannot prevent the common cold and prayer cannot cure bone 
cancer.9 But when the throat begins to feel raw, or while awaiting 
the results of the biopsy, some among these very same people are 
highly disposed to purchase echinacea or stop by a temple, church 
or synagogue. As for herbs like echinacea, since the common cold 
is typically just a nuisance, one might wonder why the person who 
categorically denies believing in its effectiveness would be so easily 
motivated to behave in accord with the belief that it is effective.10 
The threat of bone cancer is of course another matter though: 
desperate to cling to life one might grasp at any measures, no 
matter how far-fetched, and without regard to whether the person 
has spent a lifetime emphatically not believing in the method that 
is being tried. Desperation trumps justification. 
Perhaps it might be argued that when confronted by 
life-threatening illness we abruptly adopt an assumption, an 
                                                 
9
 I am presupposing that few people have the intellectual courage of a John 
Diamond (2001), who steadfastly refused to yield to superstition or ungrounded 
claims, even though he was gravely ill. Instead, he devoted his time to his attempt 
to complete “Snake Oil,” his critique of alternative medicine. Also, note that “for 
the most part intelligence is orthogonal to and independent of belief” (Shermer, 
2002: 285), that educational level does not influence susceptibility to superstition 
(Case, 2000), that maintaining a dubious attitude toward a proposition requires 
energy (Gilbert, 1993), and that stress and uncertainty incline one to resort to 
superstition (Keinan, 2002).  
10 Bausell (2007) provides a detailed survey of complementary and alternative 
medicine (CAM); a preponderance of evidence shows that nearly all CAMs, 
including echinacea, are ineffective.  
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attitude that need only be “tentatively” held, like a heuristic, in 
order to motivate experimentation with herbs or prayer. But to 
characterize this attitude as a heuristic, after a life-time of 
deliberate, well-considered, disbelief, would be odd. Typically 
assumptions are adopted as a means of exploring the unfamiliar, in 
an attempt to gain new knowledge. But that does not seem to be a 
straightforward characterization of what is happening here, for by 
hypothesis these are cases concerning which the person previously 
explored the relevant claims and, for good reason, rejected them. It 
seems more natural to say that desperation alters belief regulation 
such that one becomes strongly influenced by non-evidential 
considerations. If this latter characterization is correct, then one 
explicitly treats non-evidential considerations as relevant to the 
question what to believe.  
Velleman allows that people will sometimes choose to error 
on the side of caution, as when worried about potential predators. 
But this does not help us to explain the avoidance of 13 or the 
abrupt decision to behave in accord with beliefs that one rejects. 
Many people are familiar with the relevant evidence (we might 
suppose them to be avid readers of the Skeptical Inquirer and like 
material), so, unlike wilderness predation, there simply is no 
reason to be wary of 13 and no reason to suddenly embrace prayer. 
Be that as it may, people do behave in these ways. 
IV. The Empirical Study of False Beliefs 
Proper characterization of the preceding examples is 
contentious. They are anecdotal and their interpretations, 
uncertain, in part due to the vagaries of introspection. But the 
limitations of introspection do not imply that an interpretive 
stalemate is inevitable. There are some well-studied examples of 
belief that systematically diverge from the truth in ways which put 
pressure on the TTV characterization; especially worthy of note 
are the “positive illusions.” These have been variously described 
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and classified but, according to one of the better known sets of 
studies, they include self-aggrandizing perceptions, illusions of 
control, and unrealistic optimism (Taylor & Brown, 1988, 
1994).11  
Shelley E. Taylor and Johathon D. Brown have amassed 
considerable evidence to suggest that people consistently see 
themselves in a more positive light; others, in a negative light, 
relative to self. In commenting on this, the “better-than-most” 
effect, they observe that it is difficult if not impossible for any one 
to be warranted in believing that he is, for example, kinder, 
warmer, more humorous and more sincere than the average person. 
As regards illusions of control, the claim is not that people believe 
themselves capable of exercising control over that which clearly 
exceeds their reach; rather, this is a moderate distortion 
concerning those things over which people are in fact able to exert 
some control. And, there is a voluminous body of literature 
testifying to the claim that most people are unrealistically 
optimistic in believing their future will be better than can be 
justified on statistical grounds.  
In effect, people tend to believe in a self-image that reassures. 
People consistently overestimate their abilities, whether in matters 
of leadership, getting along with others, or even just driving skills. 
These tendencies are not merely widespread among the poorly 
educated; as many as 94% of university professors assessed 
themselves as better at their jobs than their “average” colleagues 
(Cross, 1977). Moreover, most people, even when provided with 
accurate, relevant base rate information, tend to underestimate the 
likelihood that they will be stricken with cancer, be in a car 
accident, get divorced, and so forth.  
                                                 
11
 For a critical assessment, see Colvin and Block (1994). Some (Heine, 2001: 
897-900) have questioned whether positive illusions are universal. The 
preponderance of evidence (Acker & Duck, 2008; Church et al., 2006), after 
allowing for some conceptual refinements and methodological tinkering, 
indicates that they are.  
604 EURAMERICA 
Pronin (2008, 2007; Pronin & Kugler, 2007; Pronin, Lin, & 
Ross, 2007) has devoted special attention to this final point. She 
discovered that when subjects are informed about “introspective 
illusions” and “bias blind spots” they, nevertheless, adjudge 
themselves to be less susceptible than others. Even when 
subjects—immediately after acting in accord with a particular 
bias—are presented with an explicit description of the bias, a 
description that indicates it is a common human tendency, they still 
fail to see themselves as liable. And these results are not indications 
of reticence, for instructions given to subjects make it clear that 
experimenters want to know whether bias is present and make it 
clear that the bias is common (Pronin, Lin, & Ross, 2002: 375).  
Emily Pronin and Matthew B. Kugler (2007) have found that 
the only way to prompt subjects to recognize personal vulnerability 
is to specifically educate them concerning the epistemic failings of 
introspection. It remains unknown though whether such focused 
education can bring about efforts to compensate for bias (Pronin, 
2007: 40). At the very least compensation would be difficult: 
recent evidence shows that the way we think about self in the 
present differs substantially from the ways in which we think about 
past or future selves. The limbic system and, consequently, affect, 
is much more engaged when people think about themselves in the 
present (Pronin, 2008: 1179-1180). This suggests that 
anticipations of the future or post hoc interpretations might be 
correctable in ways that judgments about the self-at-this-moment 
are not.  
Does this evidence unequivocally demonstrate that Velleman 
is wrong in claiming that only unacknowledged non-evidential 
considerations can affect belief regulation? Not necessarily. Since 
the strategy here is not to cherry-pick results, it must be admitted 
that some evidence suggests, at least for individual events, after 
carefully being instructed concerning the frailty of introspectively 
based knowledge, subjects are capable of discerning a gap between 
a belief and the truth. The original belief might even be 
classified—albeit in retrospect—as the result of an illusion. But 
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what the evidence also shows is that treating t-belief as incidental 
leads us to overlook just how deeply ingrained is the tendency to 
aim away from the truth. If we are compelled to confront our 
epistemic frailty, in narrowly defined contexts, and just for the 
nonce, we might be able to respond in accord with TTV. But what 
TTV omits is the difficulty of accomplishing such a belief revision, 
the transience of such a revision, and an understanding of why 
TTV-effects are both difficult and transient. In a word, aiming at 
the truth can be a very unnatural act.  
That TTV cognitions do not come naturally might be the 
result of their being detrimental in several aspects of our lives. 
Positive illusions can lead to higher motivation, greater persistence, 
and increased likelihood of success (Armor & Taylor, 2003; Taylor 
& Brown, 1988, 1994; Taylor & Gollwitzer, 1995)—all 
characteristics that can contribute to the cultivation of self-respect. 
Athletes, dancers, and soldiers with conviction are more likely to 
succeed than are those who lack conviction—albeit not nearly so 
likely as they believe. Positive illusions can also promote use of 
efficient and rapid problem-solving strategies. There is even 
evidence to suggest that positive illusions as regards one’s children 
or one’s partner are critical to successful parenting and to 
long-term relationships (Barelds-Dijkstra & Barelds, 2008; Wenger 
& Fowers, 2008).  
Lionel Tiger (1999: 617) has argued along similar lines that 
“moderate” optimism is essential to overcoming our cognitive 
ability “to generate endlessly discouraging predictions of the 
pitfalls of any action.” He argues (1999: 615) that we are endowed 
with a “cognitive override . . . a moderate design defect of pure 
reason,” something that overrides “cognitive literalness,” that 
“biases the odds in favor of action” (1999: 619). Among many 
other supporting observations, he records that recent examination 
of the dentition of pre-hominids reveals that 3.5 million years ago 
our East African savannah ancestors were eating large amounts of 
meat when prey animals were hard to catch. Concerning this point 
he observes that those who woke up thinking “‘What a great day to 
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catch an ungulate’ would enjoy an advantage over fellow citizens 
who turned off the alarm and rolled over to sleep straight through 
the prey’s spurt or morning activity” (1999: 616, also see 1985). 
But more is involved than just enhanced performance. 
Positive illusions can be adaptive for psychological health and 
well-being. Some evidence suggests (Alloy, 1995; Alloy & 
Abramson, 1988; Alloy & Ahrens, 1987; Taylor & Brown, 1988, 
1994) that there is a group of people who accept both the good 
and bad about themselves: they remember both good and bad 
self-relevant information with equal frequency; their evaluations of 
self and others are congruent; their self-appraisals more nearly 
coincide with appraisals produced by impartial observers, and so 
forth. The group of people in question are those “who are low in 
self-esteem, moderately depressed, or both.”12 It is sometimes said 
of these people that their beliefs bespeak a “depressive realism” 
(Alloy, 1995; Alloy & Ahrens, 1987). When well-adjusted people 
process self-relevant information, they tend to be biased and partial; 
those who are dysphoric tend to be unbiased and balanced. 
Perhaps the single most distinctive finding in this regard is that 
depressed subjects, dramatically unlike those who are not 
depressed, “are consistently accurate judges of their control over 
events” (Alloy & Abramson, 2007: 242).  
The claim is not that positive illusions are a necessary 
condition for mental health; rather, it is that these illusions can 
promote mental health (Taylor & Brown, 1994: 25). But that is 
not all. Positive illusions also seem to be protective of physical 
health (Taylor, Kemeny, Reed, Bower, & Gruenewald, 2000). For 
example, studies of AIDS patients reveal that those who believe 
they can control the disease and prevent its recurrence, those who 
do not “realistically” accept or appraise their condition, both 
exhibit a longer asymptomatic period and live longer, by an 
                                                 
12
 What seems to be true of the moderately depressed is not necessarily true of the 
severely depressed. As regards the latter, findings are equivocal (Alloy & 
Abramson, 2007; McKendree-Smith & Scogin, 2000).  
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average of nine months.13 Studies of breast cancer and of AIDS 
patients also show that even the eventual disconfirmation of 
erroneous beliefs does not have harmful consequences. Moreover, 
what is true of the sick is also true of the healthy (Taylor, Lerner, 
Sherman, Sage, & McDowell, 2003): those with positive illusions, 
while undergoing stressful tests in a laboratory setting, exhibit 
lower cardiovascular responses, quicker recovery, and lower 
baseline cortisol levels.  
Strategically aiming away from the truth contributes to 
enhanced performance, a sense of well-being, and better physical 
health. Significantly, the findings concerning physical and mental 
health are further confirmed insofar as they dovetail with studies of 
placebo and nocebo effectiveness. These carefully studied beliefs, 
when coupled with the studies of positive illusion, are redolent of 
the example sketched above, in a way that suggests an explanation 
for the durability of superstition.  
A placebo effect is that which follows from the administration 
of a pharmacologically inert substance or physiologically inactive 
treatment14 that is coupled with the verbal suggestion of clinical 
benefit. Nocebo effects also follow upon administration of an inert 
treatment, differing from placebos in that they are accompanied by 
suggestion of clinical harm (Benedetti, 2008; Diederich & Goetz, 
2008; Oken, 2008; Zubieta & Stohler, 2009).15 Nocebos, in that 
                                                 
13
 One physiological factor that seems to contribute to the non-realists more robust 
health is their ability to maintain a higher level of CD4 T helper cells.  
14
 A placebo can be any clinical intervention, whether words, gestures, pills, various 
devices, or surgery. There are even hierarchies of effectiveness: e.g. injections are 
more effective than pills, and incisions more effective than injections (Evans, 
2004).  
15
 Verbal suggestion is not essential; sensory stimuli in an evocative setting (e.g. the 
sight of a syringe while sitting in a clinic) can be sufficient to elicit the effect. But 
when considering the effects of placebos, one must be careful to factor out other 
causes, e.g. spontaneous remission, regression to the mean, and patient biases. 
Moreover, effectiveness can vary. This variation might be explainable in terms of 
functional differences in the mesolimbic dopaminergic pathway (Scott, Stohler, 
Egnatuk, Wang, Koeppe, & Zubieta, 2007).  
608 EURAMERICA 
their effects are adverse, bear more direct resemblance to the 
alleged consequences of ignoring superstitions. 16  What matters 
though is that the nocebo or placebo, despite being inert, by virtue 
of engaging a person’s belief—in a manner that aims away from the 
truth—is able to bring about a measurable physiological outcome, 
salubrious or noxious (Benedetti, 2008: 36, 48).  
Placebos have been demonstrated to have salubrious effects in 
the treatment of many conditions, e.g. pain, swelling, addiction, 
cardiovascular and respiratory problems, peptic ulcers, depression, 
anxiety, cancer, and Parkinson’s disease (Benedetti, 2008; Evans, 
2004). Some of the mechanisms17 whereby belief is able to effect 
these changes include: the release of endogenous opioids or 
dopamine, the inhibition of serotonin uptake, the reduction of 
β–adrenergic heart activity, as well as the conditioning of immune 
receptors like lymphocytes and hormones like cortisol. Further, 
differentiation among types of placebo effectiveness are being 
teased apart: for example, conscious expectation seems to play a 
greater role in alleviating pain and enhancing motor performance, 
whereas classical conditioning can be sufficient to trigger immune 
and hormonal responses (Benedetti, 2008: 42; Nieme, 2009).  
Once again recall that, according to Velleman, when we 
discern a gap between a belief and the truth, the belief becomes 
unsettled and starts to change. Studies of placebos, however, reveal 
a dissociation between different forms of belief regulation: one 
results from conscious expectation, the other, from classical 
conditioning. A natural explanation of superstition susceptibility 
now suggests itself. A person who, sincerely and for good reason, 
denies holding the belief that 13 is unlucky, might, due to 
analogues of classical conditioning that occur in everyday life,18 
                                                 
16
 Perhaps the most famous documented example of a nocebo effect is “voodoo 
death” (Lex, 1977).  
17
 PET technology (Mayberg, Sliva, Brannan, Tekell, Mahurin, McGinnis, et al., 
2002) has made it possible to begin teasing apart the functional neuroanatomy, 
even distinguishing it from the effects of pharmacologically active treatments.  
18
 See, for example, Brunstrom (2007) and Stockhorst, Enck, and Klosterhalfen 
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come to behave in such a way that can best be explained by the 
belief that 13 is unlucky. Even if acting in that way contravenes 
professed beliefs, it is not obvious these non-evidential 
considerations (those regulated by classical conditioning) can only 
be influential if unacknowledged. Although this might strike some 
as absurd, perhaps the apparent absurdity merely reflects a design 
compromise that has been achieved during our evolutionary 
development.19
Placebo beliefs are like positive illusions in that both are false. 
But placebos are false in a distinctive way. To illustrate this point, 
compare placebo effectiveness with positive illusions that cause 
people to be overconfident in the extent and effectiveness of their 
control. What they are right about is in believing that they exercise 
some control; they are wrong, however, in their assessment of how 
much control they have. A person who asserts that he has the 
ability to hit a 450 foot home run might be wrong by a degree that 
is easily calculable. But a person who asserts that by drinking a 
particular potion (perhaps a mix of tap water, sugar, and food 
coloring) his peptic ulcer will be cured is completely wrong. There 
is nothing in the potion that will contribute to his cure; it is 
pharmacologically inert. Nevertheless, effective brain mechanisms 
can in this way be set in motion.  
Today placebo effects are often triggered by the presence of 
doctors, medications, needles, even just the smell of a clinic, all 
things that are highly correlated with effective treatment. But this 
could not have been the case within which placebo mechanisms 
evolved. And, for both modern and antediluvian placebos, we 
know for a fact that any correlations which might obtain are 
non-causal.  
Consider the candidate mechanisms cited above: the release 
                                                                                                      
(2007).  
19
 McKay and Dennett (2009) side with Humphrey (2002) in treating placebo 
“misbeliefs” as by-product, not adaptation. My speculations in this regard differ, 
but nothing critical to the central thesis turns on this difference.  
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of opioids or dopamine, the conditioning of immune receptors, the 
inhibition of serotonin uptake, or the reduction ofβ–adrenergic 
heart activity. Presumably they are activated by means of some 
form of mind-body “lingua franca” (Humphrey, 2004; see also 
Beauregard, 2007: 233), the psychological side necessarily 
involving false beliefs. Also note that modern medicine is scarcely 
more than a century old: 20  we are not long past the days of 
blood-letting and ignorance of microscopic organisms. The 
mind-body lingua franca apparently evolved in an environment 
under which the input constraints definitive of (those) beliefs could 
not have been yielding true beliefs. After all, lacking alternatives, 
systematic examination of shamanic beliefs, rituals, and 
incantations, including careful consideration of instances of failure, 
would hardly have been worth the effort. And morbid acceptance 
of death and disease was likely no more helpful to individual or 
group esprit during the Pleistocene than it is today. So it is for 
good reason that the placebo effect is, as Bakan (1985: 212-213) 
has written, demonstrated “precisely in cases in which expectancy 
is falsely grounded.” 
To say that these beliefs aim away from the truth is not to say 
that they also aim away from “instrumental success.” But recall 
that Velleman insists such goals are “second-order.” The 
contention here, by contrast, is that belief regulatory systems 
evolved at a time when aiming for the truth, in some areas of life, 
would have been as pointless as counseling Aristotle to devote 
more attention to the brain—millennia before the development of 
neuroscience. In this area of life, for good reason, instrumental 
success supersedes truth-conduciveness. 
Reflection on the modern world suggests that communities 
maintain repositories of false beliefs and humans retain wells of 
                                                 
20
 Although if “medicine” is defined as “the provision of special care to the sick by 
others,” it might be very old (Evans, 2002: 459). But to establish my point it is 
only necessary that most medical claims concerning the cause of cures were 
groundless.  
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gullibility that can be drawn upon during times of social turmoil or 
personal crisis. To cite just one example, Pascal Boyer (2000: 
99-100, 105-106) has found that when dealing with religion we 
are naturally inclined to be gullible as concerns the “odd” or the 
“unfamiliar.” Paradigmatic of these are spirits who are represented 
as intentional agents, but agents whose physical properties violate 
the physical qualities of embodied agents. Not only are these 
violations not taken as evidence that the entities aren’t real, instead, 
“it is precisely insofar as a certain situation violates intuitive 
principles and is taken as real that it may become particularly 
salient” (Boyer, 2000: 101). In effect it appears that appropriately 
structured systems of false belief remain available within society, 
accessible to all, and ready when needed.21  
A third set of beliefs that aim from the truth are referred to as 
self-deception (Mele, 1997: 92, 2001: 4). These too are extremely 
common: paradigmatic examples include people who believe in 
their spouse’s fidelity, their likelihood of recovery from illness, or 
their child’s avoidance of illicit drugs, despite the availability of 
evidence so compelling that were it about the spouse, the illness, or 
the child of someone else, their confidence would surely be shaken. 
Alfred R. Mele (1997: 93-94) has noted that these self-deceptions 
prime other cognitive mechanisms, such that they then contribute 
to the production of yet more false beliefs, mechanisms that 
include information salience, the availability heuristic, 
confirmation bias, and our tendency to search for causal 
                                                 
21
 Some might contend that the apparent diminishing influence of institutional 
churches suggests diminished gullibility to beliefs that are not regulated in 
truth-conducive ways. Perhaps it is true that institutions of this sort are 
diminishing in influence—in some parts of the world—but that fact doesn’t 
imply a diminishing influence of such beliefs. The case of France might be 
instructive in this regard: it has experienced an ever dwindling supply of Roman 
Catholic clergy. According to tax authorities the number is now down to 36,000. 
But, according to those same tax authorities, France now has 40,000 
professional astrologers (Kahane & Cavender, 2002: 137). If I am correct, a 
Conservation of Credulity principle seems to play an important role in human 
society.  
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explanations. If Mele is correct, then one false belief can lead to a 
concatenation of further false beliefs. According to Robert Trivers 
(2000: 125) some self-deceptions function as do positive illusions. 
But he (1985, 2000) also suggests that self-deception has a unique 
role: it was favored by natural selection because it enhances our 
ability to deceive others. The idea is that if we first deceive self (e.g. 
a politician who says to his constituents, “I feel your pain”), then 
the autonomic nervous system changes that might indicate 
falsehood to others would not be manifest. Creatures capable of 
self-deception could then reap certain Machiavellian rewards.22
There is abundant evidence that sometimes beliefs are 
regulated so to aim away from the truth. What’s more, the 
mechanisms engaged in production of false belief are difficult to 
override. Consider, for example, that rejection of a superstition 
might have been regulated in truth-conducive ways. And because 
the rejection is so thorough, it should not be subject to 
truth-conducive revision or extinction. But, prior to rejection, if 
one has been classically conditioned, in that the superstition was 
learned early in life and under the proper conditions, despite 
having later been extinguished, self-control will still be required to 
resist its influence. According to the ego-depletion hypothesis, 
self-control is like muscle strength (Muraven & Baumeister, 2000). 
It is a limited resource that can be exhausted by excessive demands 
and, once depleted (e.g. as indicated by low levels of blood 
glucose), recovery is slow (Galliot et al., 2007). Accordingly, we 
should not be surprised to discover that when the ego is depleted, 
                                                 
22
 In both the empirical and the philosophical literature, there is a general 
consensus that “self-deception” names an important phenomenon. But most 
discussion of this phenomenon is contentious. These controversies are fueled by 
the lack of convincing laboratory demonstrations (Paulhus, 2007) and by worries 
pertaining to specific interpretations, e.g. self-deception does not always help 
with the deception of others in the way that Trivers and other evolutionary 
psychologists have claimed (Van Leeuwen, 2007: 335). For purposes of this 
paper it is sufficient that self-deception illustrates both the generation of false 
beliefs and that it suggests one aspect of T-belief’s capacity for causally affecting 
psychological and social circumstance.  
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as can happen when one is under great stress, people might behave 
in ways that contravene professed beliefs. And if one is trained to 
recognize the indicators of depletion, it would not be surprising to 
find that they are capable of acknowledging the role non-evidential 
considerations— e.g. low-levels of blood glucose—play in 
determining what is believed.  
When considering whether beliefs might aim at something 
other than the truth, recall that Velleman invokes a basketball 
analogy. Regardless of whether this analogy can be cogently 
applied to beliefs of any kind, it certainly does not fit here. By that 
analogy, within the game, one plays to win (the first-order aim), 
because doing so will ensure salary increase (the second-order aim, 
the ultimate aim). To take the case of placebos as an example, 
clearly their ultimate—the second-order—aim is to be restored to 
good health. But to realize that ultimate aim, one cannot adopt a 
first-order goal of aiming at the truth; to do so would be 
self-defeating. On the court—in the game of life—it is not the case 
that these beliefs are truth-directed. In these contexts, truth- 
directedness and instrumental success are at odds with one 
another.  
V. The Distinctive Character of Tertullian Beliefs 
What is most distinctive about the cluster of beliefs described 
above is that they aim away from the truth. I have dubbed them 
Tertullian beliefs, or t-beliefs.23 Tertullian seems a proper eponym 
because it is (apocryphally) said that he proclaimed: “I believe 
because it is absurd.”24 What he (Tertullian, 2010) actually wrote 
                                                 
23
 Reflection on some of the empirical evidence presented here has prompted 
others to wonder whether the relevant attitude is hope, not belief (Flanagan, 
2002: 22, fn. 4). But hope seems ambiguous between belief and desire, not an 
amalgam (as will be described here). Hope in the sense of “hopeful” seems to be 
nothing more than belief in a better future (Breznitz, 1999: 629); and, most uses 
of “I hope” seem synonymous with “I desire” or “I want.”  
24
 Tertullian’s words are a common textbook example of irrationalism (Quine & 
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was, “certum est, quia impossible:” that is, “it is certain, because it 
is impossible.” The idea of believing because it is “absurd” or 
“impossible,” though a bit hyperbolic, evinces the deliberateness of 
aiming away. What matters is not that the beliefs are false. What 
matters is that they seem calibrated to be false, in a certain way, 
and to a certain degree.25 The effectiveness of a positive illusion, a 
placebo, or self-deception depends upon aiming, in just the right 
way, a calibration which seems achievable only as the result of 
design. 
As a first approximation the metaphor “direction-of-fit” can 
be employed to capture the distinction between t-beliefs and TTV 
beliefs (Searle, 2001: 37-38, 257). TTV beliefs exhibit a mind- 
to-world direction of fit; t-beliefs, on the other hand, exhibit a 
world-to-mind direction of fit. Mind-to-world direction-of-fit 
implies that it is the purpose of TTV beliefs to change so that they 
match the world. Ordinarily world-to-mind direction of fit— 
representation not of how things are, but of how we would like 
things to be—is used to characterize the attitude “desire.” Of desire 
it can be said that its purpose is to change the world to match its 
content.  
T-beliefs, like desire, aim to change the world. 26  In this 
respect, they are unlike TTV beliefs. Nevertheless, they are asserted 
in such a way as to imply that they represent how things are—13 is 
unlucky, I am better-than-average, the waters of Lourdes have 
curative powers, or I am sincere. T-beliefs are not regarded as true 
in a fanciful, polemical, or heuristic way. The spirit in which the 
propositional object is regarded as true is serious.  
                                                                                                      
Ullian, 1978: 60). 
25
 A balance must be maintained: too much positive illusion, and one will be 
disinclined to seek available help. Too little, and one might despair. Daniel 
Gilbert (2005: 177-178) refers to this as a “psychological immune system” that 
must, like its physiological counterpart, maintain a balance between hypo and 
hyper activity.  
26
 Other amalgams of belief and desire have been proposed, e.g. “besire” 
(Blackburn, 1998: 97-100).  
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T-beliefs require a blurring of the usual belief-desire 
distinction. Direction-of-fit can help elucidate this relationship, but 
it remains just a metaphor (cf. Sobel & Copp, 2001). Fortunately 
direction-of-fit can be further explicated in terms of causal 
connectedness. Consider again self-confidence, self-healing, and 
self-deception. The beliefs associated with these phenomena are 
generated by mechanisms that aim away from the truth. Not only 
that, like desire they conspire to change the world to match their 
content. When they succeed, it is not by accident. Rather their 
success results from their being about the same part of the world 
(the body) that they inhabit, either intra-cranially or inter- 
personally. Positive illusions and placebos can be effective intra- 
cranially via the appropriate mind-body lingua franca, and self- 
deceptions can be effective by shutting down autonomic reactions 
that would otherwise be detectable to those one wants to persuade. 
This corner of the world—the intra-cranial and the interpersonal— 
is, so to speak, within striking range of belief. There is a causal link 
between these beliefs and that portion of the world that they 
target.27  
Note that t-belief is not reducible to desire. People who 
merely “want” to be better-than-average, to recover good health, 
or to be inter-personally successful don’t succeed in the way that 
those who t-believe do. A clear distinction between mere wanting 
and believing remains: the moderately depressed want to perform 
at a higher level they just don’t believe that they will. And most 
who fall ill want to recover. But only t-belief improves chances of 
recovery by means of the intra-cranial causal nexus. Simple desire, 
mere wanting, doesn’t cut it.  
Another way to approach this distinctive blend of belief and 
desire is to note that it can help to diminish the puzzlement of a 
                                                 
27
 Tamar Szabó Gendler (2008) has recently introduced the concept “alief.” Like 
t-belief alief is claimed to “govern all sorts of belief-discordant behavior” (2008: 
663). But t-belief differs in several respects, including its ability to change the 
world to match its content.  
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philosophical curio, Moore’s Paradox. Consider that denouncing a 
superstition but being influenced to act in accord with that 
superstition seems rather like an instance of “p but I don’t believe 
that p.” In other words, it is suggestive of what has come to be 
called Moore’s Paradox, which is just a paradox in the informal 
sense for “p” and “I don’t believe that p” might both be true. 
Nevertheless, since asserting “p” seems to imply the belief that p, 
this is typically regarded as an utterance of a type that I cannot 
sensibly assert of myself. 28  In the superstition case we have 
apparently contradictory expressions, both the assertion “I don’t 
believe that p” and behavior which seems best explainable by 
attributing the belief “p.” Typically it is claimed that one could not 
self-ascribe both.29 But when one is aware of what is implied by 
one’s behavior, such self-ascription is possible.  
Jeanette Kennett and Cordelia Fine (2008: 176-177) have 
found that psychopaths and sociopathic delinquents produce many 
statements that are “Moorean paradoxical” (cf. Joyce, 2007: 
51-57). As a typical example, consider: “John is an honest person. 
Of course, he has been involved in some shady deals!” As with 
Moorean paradoxes generally, when treated as a whole, the 
statement seems to make no sense. Kennett and Fine treat this 
paradox as a measure by which to determine whether the 
psychopaths or sociopaths grasp what is implied by evaluative 
terms.  
What I am suggesting is that healthy people are capable of 
Moorean paradoxical expressions in that their professions of belief 
are contravened by behaviors whose implications are recognizable 
to the subject. This tension between what one professes and how 
one behaves reflects a design compromise, one which for most 
                                                 
28
 Moore’s concern was to illustrate the distinction between what is asserted and 
what is implied; Wittgenstein bestowed the name “Moore’s paradox” (Baldwin, 
1990: 226). 
29
 Note that the same could not be said of unalloyed desire. “I want it to be the 
case that p” and “not-p” are not inconsistent (cf. Crane, 2001: 102- 105).  
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people is salubrious. If this view is correct, we can reasonably 
expect that those who are mildly depressed, should be more 
sensitive to the implications of Moore’s paradox; therefore, they 
would be less likely to behave in ways that contradict their 
professed beliefs.30  
One might wonder why this aspect of belief has yet to be duly 
recognized. After all the relevant scientific studies can now be 
traced back to well over two decades. Perhaps it is that one of the 
institutions which consistently gives these beliefs pride of place, 
religion, is not taken seriously.31 Perhaps as well we live in a world 
with so many dangerous false beliefs that we fail to appreciate 
non-TTV forms of belief regulation (Bennett & Hacker, 2003: 
172-174). A further factor that causes neglect of t-belief might 
derive from an under-appreciation of what Wallace Arthur (2004) 
calls “internal adaptations.”  
Arthur (2004: 117-127) points out that “ecological” 
adaptations, adaptations to the (external) physical environment, 
receive most attention in biology; internal adaptations or 
“coadaptations,” adaptations among body parts, tend to be 
neglected. An example of the former is the adaptation of forest 
flies to higher ambient temperatures (Arthur, 2004: 122-123): flies 
must struggle to stave off desiccation. The hotter it gets, the faster 
they lose water. Because the larger one is, the smaller one’s surface 
area is relative to volume, and because water loss occurs at the 
body’s surface, in a dry, hot environment being bigger is better. In 
accord with selective pressure, the average body size of the fly 
population will increase. Because the fitness difference is clearly 
produced by the external environment, this counts as an external 
adaptation. 
                                                 
30
 This is a testable implication of the t-belief hypothesis.  
31
 Richard Dawkins (1993) stakes out an especially uncompromising position: he 
regards religious beliefs as either marks of cowardice or as “pernicious,” 
symptoms of disease such that those who hold them should be regarded as 
“patients.” 
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But suppose that along with the difference in body size, these 
flies also differ in the way their wings are connected to their thorax. 
Suppose as well that this variation slightly affects their ability to fly. 
Under such circumstances, the population will evolve toward better 
integrated joints. Here though selection is unrelated to the forest’s 
change in ambient temperature; it isn’t even related to the forest. 
Although flight occurs in environments, good flying ability is 
generally advantageous for flies, no matter what environment they 
inhabit. Accordingly, these fitness differences are “quasi- 
environment-independent.” Internal selection, in an important 
sense, “travels with the organism wherever it goes.”32
Relating this distinction to t-belief, we might say that most 
philosophical attention to belief has concerned “ecological 
adaptations.” Understandable though this might be, the “internal” 
environment is also part of that to which we must adapt.33 And 
because t-belief is so critical to internal adaptations, it warrants 
more attention than it receives from within the TTV conceptual 
framework.  
W. V. O. Quine (1994: 66) famously wrote: “Creatures 
inveterately wrong in their inductions have a pathetic but 
praise-worthy tendency to die before reproducing their kind.” This 
clever turn-of-phrase strikes many as necessarily true. But it 
misleads. Sometimes we are wrong for good reason. And, to grasp 
what counts as a good reason, we should attend to internal 
adaptations.34 A balance must be struck between the external and 
                                                 
32
 “External” and “internal” are best understood as occupying opposite ends of a 
continuous spectrum.  
33
 A relevant example of this is the “tragedy of cognition” (Atran, 2003): we can 
meta-represent self and others, project the future, and envision the demise of all 
we care about. These too are part of the environment that we must adapt to.  
34
 I do claim that t-beliefs can be adaptive, in that they enhance fitness. Whether or 
not they count as biological adaptations (i.e. whether or not we have inherited 
them because they enhanced the fitness of our ancestors) is not something that 
needs to be dealt with here (cf. Buller, 2005: 35). But because false beliefs can 
seem so non-functional (cf. Konner, 2002: 15), and because maintaining a 
proper balance and calibration seems very complex (cf. Buller, 2005: 31-37), I 
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the internal, between TTV and t-belief. Accuracy of inductions 
concerning the external world is not enough. Neglect of internal 
adaptations can also lead to pathetic but praise-worthy ends.  
VI. Wood’s Procedural Principle and T-Beliefs 
Recall that Wood (2008: 13, fn. 8) presupposes that no one 
can stably hold a belief they know to be false. But there appear to 
be counter-examples to this claim. In the anecdotal cases, people 
behave in accord with superstitions and purchase vanity products 
or resort to miracle cures, even when they can fairly be said to 
know that recourse to these strategies or products is grounded in 
false beliefs.  
As regards empirical studies of t-beliefs, even when subjects 
are presented with explicit description of cognitive biases 
immediately after acting in accord with those biases, they exhibit 
no evidence of belief instability. If the notion of “instability” is 
unpacked in the way proposed by Velleman—i.e. gaps between 
belief and truth are reconciled by either adding new beliefs or 
changing those originally held—it seems that at most the instability 
of believing is narrowly circumscribed. Only if compelled to 
confront evidence in constrained experimental settings might one 
evince the predicted adjustments. And even these meager findings 
might not be ecologically valid. In sum, there is no evidence, 
independent of claims based upon contentious introspective 
reports, that belief instability is a natural disposition.  
As regards the ethics of belief, Wood (2002: 38-40) 
acknowledges the possibility of exceptions to the procedural 
principle. But he regards criticisms of it that are based upon this 
possibility as “cheap” and “wrongheaded.” Even should a person 
determine that the principle need be violated, Wood counsels that 
                                                                                                      
suspect biological evolution may have played some role. Nevertheless, since no 
precision can as yet be given to the claims of usefulness here, it is better to allow 
that t-belief mechanisms are labile with the environment.  
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the person should “feel squeamish and conflicted.”  
Wood’s (2002: 33) harsh judgment in this regard is motivated 
by his belief that violations of the procedural principle are 
“shameful in something of the same way that telling lies is 
shameful.” When we believe that which is “comfortable to 
believe,” we show contempt for self and perform a disservice to 
others. That is, we fail to respect ourselves as rational beings and 
we deprive others of honest evaluations that they might need.  
Doubtless Wood (2008: 13) is correct that one need not look 
long or far to find innumerable examples of “shameless evasions.” 
But if we apply a principle of psychological realism to our moral 
theories,35 then there are reasons to be dubious of the procedural 
principle. First, there is good reason to believe that gaps between 
belief and truth do not necessarily precipitate instability. We seem 
to be designed in such a way as to allow for these inconsistencies, 
without the untoward spill-over effects that concern Wood. A 
stable compromise has been forged between internal and external 
adaptations. The more closely one examines instability claims, the 
more they seem to be artifact derived from unwarranted 
philosophical expectations of consistency.  
Second, if we were to feel squeamish and conflicted each time 
we acted in accord with a positive illusion or with the distribution 
of a placebo, the benefits of illusions and placebos would not be 
attainable. As regards self, for the positive illusions to contribute to 
our well-being (and not, say, exacerbate depressive realism), we 
should not feel squeamish or conflicted. As regards our treatment 
of others, for the placebo to be effective, likewise, we should not 
feel squeamish or conflicted, as these would be evident to the 
patient.36 And if the benefits of t-belief were not forthcoming, the 
                                                 
35
 According to Owen Flanagan’s (1991: 32) Principle of Minimal Psychological 
Realism, our moral theories should not require of us that which is not possible 
for creatures like us (also see Doris, 2002: 112).  
36
 Note that placebo induction seems to be the only deliberate induction of a false 
belief that Wood (2008: 14) finds acceptable, albeit grudgingly: “To lie 
paternalistically to people may sometimes help them (for instance, to overcome a 
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results would include diminished health, performance, motivation, 
and well-being.  
In addition to Wood’s skepticism that there are legitimate 
exceptions to the procedural principle,37 he believes that violations 
are essentially “corrupting” (2002: 36). He believes that people are 
inclined to take unacceptable liberties, allowing for both 
unrestrained rationalizations of personal behavior and dishonesty 
in public discourse. But t-beliefs seem to be legitimate exceptions, 
and there is no empirical evidence that the tendency to act in 
accord with t-beliefs leads to the corrupting tendencies that are the 
object of Wood’s concern. It might be the case that Wood is 
correct in his assessment of other beliefs. But it is not difficult to 
conceive of people who hold positive illusions, self deceive in the 
standard circumstances, and react to placebos in ways that enable 
them to be effective, while not allowing for these breaches of the 
procedural principle to adversely affect other aspects of their lives 
or of public discourse. T-beliefs seem designed so as to be insulated 
from the rest of our beliefs.  
What Wood’s advocacy of an uncompromising adherence to 
the procedural principle requires is evidence of a particular sort. 
For example, if it turns out to be the case that depressive realists 
are less inclined to corruption and more respectful of self than are 
the majority of people, then Wood’s views could be said to be 
rightly affirmed. But there is no evidence of this sort; none, 
whatsoever.  
It might be said that Wood’s view reflects a strictly normative 
position, and that empirical evidence, be it anecdotal or scientific, 
is of no relevance. But, just as a matter of fact, Wood justifies his 
uncompromising position by making specific empirical claims 
                                                                                                      
life-threatening illness), but . . . it shows a lack of respect . . . and seems 
justifiable only temporarily, under very special conditions.” 
37
 “There are no matters about which we do not owe it both to ourselves and to 
others to maintain our intellectual integrity by forming our beliefs according to 
the evidence” (Wood, 2002: 33).  
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about the nature of belief as well as about the tendencies of people 
who fail to act in accord with the procedural principle. To show 
that these empirical assumptions are dubious as regards t-belief 
then is to weaken support for Wood’s version of this principle.  
Furthermore, the evidence suggests that, contrary to what 
Wood maintains, t-beliefs might be critical to—rather than 
detrimental to—the maintenance of self-respect. What is neglected 
is the compromise between internal and external adaptations, as 
well as the causal role that t-beliefs can play. TTV tends to treat 
t-beliefs as incidental; Wood takes this view a step further and 
treats them as “pernicious.” But when properly calibrated, they can 
help alleviate depression, improve health, enhance motivation, and 
improve performance. Depression, ill health, indolence, and failure 
are not contributors to self-respect. They are obstacles. What both 
anecdotal and empirical evidence suggest is that an appropriate 
dose of the right kind of false beliefs might be a necessary 
condition for the development of self-respect. Sometimes it pays to 
be Moorean paradoxical.  
Recall Tiger’s speculation concerning the lot of a pre-hominid 
who lacked the capacity for t-believing. It is simply too easy “to 
generate endlessly discouraging predictions of the pitfalls of any 
action” (Tiger, 1999: 617). We seem to need an antidote to 
“cognitive literalness,” something that moves us to action. T-beliefs, 
in right measure, just are that antidote. Without them we are less 
inclined to taking action in a whole host of ways that are essential 
for self-respect.  
Wood (2008: 19) emphasizes that self-respect requires the 
apportioning of belief strictly in accord with the evidence. But 
those who best adhere to this requirement as regards beliefs about 
self tend to have low self-esteem (Alloy, 1995; Alloy & Ahrens, 
1987). The claim advanced here is that a certain measure of 
self-esteem is a precondition for self-respect. Those who are 
without t-beliefs seem to lack the minimum esprit necessary for the 
maintenance of that which Wood values so highly.  
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VII. Conclusion 
Wood (2002: 8, 2008: 9) emphasizes that we are responsible 
for the processes of belief formation and maintenance. Just as we 
would be blameworthy for killing someone in a drunken rage, so 
too we are blameworthy for acting in accord with beliefs that are 
not properly formed or maintained. In the former case, we should 
have known not to get drunk. In the same way, we behave 
irresponsibly when we allow cognitive biases to lead away from the 
truth. We are obliged to be proactive.  
Might Wood have a point here? Perhaps the way things are 
with beliefs is blinding us from the way things could be. Perhaps we, 
individually and collectively, need to be weaned from t-beliefs. And 
perhaps this would be a good thing. But the formal investigations 
of Pronin (2007) suggest that weaning is not an option.  
Less formally, it seems to be the case that when progress is 
made toward reducing the effects of cognitive biasing on one front, 
those biases reemerge on another. Above I noted that, in France, as 
the number of Roman Catholic clergy decrease in numbers, the 
number of professional astrologers increase. A Conservation of 
Credulity Principle seems to be in effect.  
Whether or not individuals or societies can be weaned from 
t-belief in such a way as to manage proper alignment with the 
procedural principle is an empirical issue. Whether or not we 
should be weaned is an ethical issue. For Wood, it would seem, the 
two become relevant to one another when we assess the cost of 
attempts at weaning. If success brings about enhanced self-respect 
and no collateral, corrupting effects, then it is a good. If it brings 
about diminished self-respect and an increase in corrupting effects, 
then it is not. If the latter, then even on Wood’s terms, the 
procedural principle should be compromised. 
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摘 要 
根據艾倫．伍德的「程序原則」，我們應該只接受可以被證成
的信念。他認為，無論是個人或群體，接受不為證據所證成的信念會
失去自尊、造成墮落。伍德的觀點和大部分分析「信念」概念的哲學
家是一致的：信念應該瞄準真理，本文將說明此觀點並提出質疑，我
將指出某些實證研究顯示，在特定情況下不瞄準真理反而更能維持自
尊、避免墮落，這些不瞄準真理的信念我稱之為T信念。本文將進一
步說明T信念的特色，以解釋在何種情況下程序原則應該被違背 
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